A poem telling the story of a man shooting a moose is a narrative poem. If the poem goes on for a long time and the moose turns out to be his daughter who got screwed by the lecherous, jealous gods and the man then founds a city, it is an epic. Many say the Age of the Epic is behind us, the rain falls upon the moose corpse and the murderous, capricious gods seem done with us, killed or wandered oV, and, unattended, unhouselled, we charge through the bracken with only the burning hoof print of human love upon us.
being readily available. From Carnap to Rorty, Horkheimer to Habermas, from Heidegger to Derrida, traditions have gathered around the claim that metaphysics has come to its end. The form of this availability bears notice, however. As a claim, it is an assertion: "metaphysics is at its end." And in its wake, one expects arguments, arguments which support the assertion and ask that we support it as well.
The "end of metaphysics" is something more than an assertion, however. Ours is a time when philosophers of diverse sensibilities cry out that metaphysics is at its end. In the tradition of Carnap and Rorty, metaphysics has drawn to an end given the triumph of naturalism, even if that triumph can only claim a pragmatic (which is not to say pyrrhic) victory. Among the critical theorists, metaphysics, as a grounding discourse, has been superseded by a critical theory whose reconstructive engine is fueled by the social sciences. And beginning with Heidegger, the end of metaphysics names a kind of exhaustion, as if the path of inquiry opened by the question "what is the nature of X" had reached a limit, one that metaphysics undoubtedly engages but cannot render transparent. Quite a range. It seems, therefore, that the end of metaphysics is both a social phenomenon and an assertion. Perhaps we should approach the former from the etymological roots of "claim," i.e., clamare, "to cry out," for many do cry out that metaphysics has come to an end. And yet, this is far from a univocal choir. The voices crying out are diverse to the point of incompatibility. We might do better, then, to pursue the matter through another descendent of clamare, i.e., "clamor," for beginning with the claim "the end of metaphysics is at hand" throws us into an uproar.
Another orienting thought. In the Lowell lectures of 1906, William James writes of the pragmatist theory of truth: "I fully expect to see the pragmatist view of truth run through the classic stages of a theory's career. First, you know, a new theory is attacked as absurd; then it is admitted to be true, but obvious and insigni cant; nally it is seen to be so important that its adversaries claim that they themselves discovered it." 2 Concerning claims pertaining to the end of metaphysics, I believe we are arriving at the end of stage two. Many, like Rorty, consider the claim banal. 3 We all know, he claims, that the heyday of metaphysics is over, so let us get on with something more interesting, if not more useful. But I want to pause in this banality, and note it, suggesting that for some "the end of metaphysics is at hand" is like a light switch, a matter of course; one icks it on in order to get on with some other task.
For a third thought, let us return to the idea of a "claim." Many, I claimed, assert that metaphysics has come to its end. If we begin with and from the claim that "the end of metaphysics is at hand," we do so within the gure of thought that Heidegger terms an "assertion," an Aussatz. This is signi cant, for on Heidegger's reading, the assertion prevents philosophy from recognizing the end of metaphysics. Why? The assertion, schematized as "X is y ," is not only "not the primary locus (Ort ) of truth," something Heidegger notes in Sein und Zeit, § 44, but is bound to Insistenz, to the errancy that Heidegger regards as a "dogged sticking to what exists, to what is oVered by beings as if they were open in and of themselves." 4 More speci cally, the assertion (or the proposition), in ascribing a predicate to a being, regards the being of this X in terms of what is present in the form of essential traits, or speaking retroactively, as empirical sciences do, in terms of those traits that can be said to endure through a series of transformations. In so comporting ourselves towards X, we forget, however, to interrogate the event of X's and our presencing, and thus overlook the Ort, the locus of disclosure. Now such forgetfulness de nes for Heidegger the history of metaphysics as a kind of nihilism, for it thinks Sein only in terms of das Seiende, as we do when asserting things, when predicating y of X. If we ask then "what does it mean to begin with and from the claim that the end of metaphysics is at hand," we might conclude that this beginning already falls back into metaphysics. Or, more humbly, we could "suggest" that to begin with such a claim is to have only just begun, that is, we could "claim" that such a claim opens the question of the end of metaphysics rather than answers it. In this regard, the regard of the claim, the end of metaphysics would be at hand only in a deferred sense, as something yet to be fathomed.
I want to draw one more preliminary thought from the notion of the claim, if only to quiet the clamor of the day, scratch the banality of what is at hand until it fades into strangeness, and heed Heidegger's worries concerning the limits of propositional thinking. Bracket, if you will, our tendencies to associate claims with assertions, and consider a lead from Webster's second edition. There we are told that a claim is a "demand for something rightfully or allegedly due." With this de nition in mind, we might regard a philosophical claim as an apologia on behalf of some matter to be thought, as a demand that some Sache be recognized. If so, beginning with and from the claim that the end of metaphysics is at hand could initiate a practice of bearing witness to a matter that demands recognition. Having begun so, we could then declare, or rather cry out, that the "end of metaphysics is at hand," emphasizing that we are working amidst an event "still on its way," to recall Nietzsche's announcement of the death of god. And thus we might leave this exhortation with an admission: as is evident from the clamor it has provoked, the end of metaphysics, as an event, has laid claim to our age, and if we make claims on its behalf, we do so with an awareness that we may need help from quarters not governed by assertions.
I. Heidegger's Ear
He made a line on the blackboard, one bold stroke from right to left diagonally downward and stood back to ask, looking at no one in particular, "What have I done?" From the back of the room Freddie shouted, "You've broken a piece of chalk." M. Degas did not smile. "What have I done?" he repeated. -Philip Levine, "M. Degas Teaches Art & Science At Durfee Intermediate School Detroit, 1942," lines 1- 9 5 In 1946, amidst the nihilism that he found characteristic of metaphysics, a nihilism that he aligned with the spread of modern technology as a mode of disclosure grounded in forgetfulness, Heidegger asked "Wozu Dichter [What are poets for?]" and proceeded to explore the work of Rilke. A few years earlier, in 1942, he had invoked Hölderlin against the onslaught of America, whose entry into World War II he described as "the ultimate act of American ahistoricality and self-devastation" (GA 53: 68; DI, 54-5). And still earlier, in 1934, when the engines of death had begun to solidify their hold on the future of the European Jewry, Heidegger had also turned to Hölderlin for direction, claiming that the "poet is the grounder of being," adding that the poetic is "the fundamental happening [Grundgeschehen] of the historical dasein of human beings" (GA 39: 33, 36). But "direction" skews the matter, for when Heidegger turned to Hölderlin in 1934, it was not for adornment or the lyric presentation of an encrypted philosophical project. In fact, he warned against such approaches, writing that: " The danger exists, that we [will] set the poetic work within concepts, that we only [will] comb a poem for the philosophical opinions and tenets of the poet, that we [will] piece together Hölderlin's philosophical system and explain the poetry from such an account" (GA 39: 5). 6 In fact, not only was Hölderlin not supposed to oVer us a philosophy in waiting, but he was to be the source of the measure for this epoch: "We do not want to measure Hölderlin according to our time, but the opposite: we want to bring ourselves and those to come under the measure of the poet" (GA 39: 4). Not direction then, but a measure, a Maß; this is what the poets oVer Heidegger; this is what they are for at the end of metaphysics. But in what sense and for whom? What is the nature of this poetic Maß? How does such a thing come to pass, even work? What kind of measuring is under discussion here? And why is it poetic? Why are poets the grounders of being? Finally, who shall be its standard bearers, and what future shall receive the Heimat, the "homeland," it demarcates? In other words, whom are these poets, or this poet, for? 7 Where should we begin? Perhaps with Heidegger's ear. How does Martin Heidegger read? In what way are his stirrup, anvil, and hammer aligned such that textual vibrations strike him quite diVerently than they do the ears of other readers? As many know, Heidegger refuses to employ traditional poetic theory.
In fact, Heidegger eschews poetics altogether, preferring to allow the poems he reads to determine for themselves the being of poetry. Why? Because traditional interpretation begins with an assumed understanding of the being of the poem. For example, psychoanalytic readings assume that the production of poetic discourse proceeds by way of unconscious forces saturated with subjective history. Likewise, Marxists employ a rhetoric of infrastructure and superstructure in accounting for the passage of social forces into poetry. Heidegger, on the other hand, wishes to allow the language of the poem to articulate its own being, and thus his interpretations refuse to assume a poetics, hoping to dissolve into the poems they would read. But how?
In answering this question, one must take note of the various studies which have appeared over the last fteen years or so, notably Gerald Bruns' Heidegger's Estrangements and Véronique Fóti's Heidegger and the Poets. Also, one should note that in 1989, an entire issue of Research in Phenomenology was devoted to Heidegger's work on Hölderlin. And yet, among these studies, few have interrogated Heidegger's reading qua reading, and none with systematic intent. 8 Indulge me, then, as I sketch such an account, engaging the distinction that anchors Heidegger's 1954 reading of Trakl, the distinction between Erörterung, "exposition," and Erläuterung, "clari cation." 9 Regarding the Erörterung, the "exposition," Heidegger informs us that, at least in its preliminary stages, it seeks to "locate" or "point out" (weisen) as well as "heed" (beachten) the Ort, the "site" of something. Heidegger calls the Ort the: According to the passage, the Ort is a gathering force. Beginning from extremes, an Ort collects something within its reach and releases it to its Wesen. Given that the issue here is poetry, the Wesen in question lies in poetizing, in how a poem comes to poetize some matter or other. To remark upon the Ort of a poem is to consider the way in which the poem is "collected" and "released" into poetizing.
Let us consider the Ort at work. Poems say things in many ways. For example, a poem might recount a poet's aesthetic development, as does Wordsworth's Prelude, or develop aesthetic commitments, as does Stevens' Notes Towards a Supreme Fiction. A poem might also portray an event in the manner of Tennyson's The Charge of the Light Brigade, or, yet again, express intense feelings of alienation as does Sylvia Plath's Firesong. If we raise the question of the Ort in these cases, the issue concerns the gathering of such poems into their poetizing, into their disclosure of aesthetic development, a philosophy of art, a battle, or an author's sense of the corruption of life. This is not an issue of poetic content, however, but an issue of a poem's focus, qua poem, upon what it would say. Wordsworth's Prelude is about aesthetic development, but the question of its Ort is concerned with the poem's ability to articulate aesthetic development. Second, this is not an issue of what the poem expresses, as if the poem were a mere symptom of some deeper, infrastructural force. An Ort can never be expressed by any poem, for a poem must already be poetizing in order to express anything. And as the Ort is precisely the site of that gathering that allows expression, it must necessarily lie before every case of expression.
If an Ort is not expressed by a poem, where does one nd it? On my reading, Heidegger opts to take the poem at its word, which is to say, he expects the language of the poem to articulate its own Ort. 10 In seeking the Ort of the poetic, he seeks what we could call an Ur-poem, a poem of poetry that marks the rim of the Ort in which the language of the poem is gathered. Of course, Heidegger does not employ the gure of the Ur-poem, but he does write of a Grundstimmung (1934), a dichtende Wort (1942), a Gedichtete (1943), Grundworte (1946), and a Gedicht (1954), all of which supposedly articulate the essential site of whatever poetry is in question (respectively, Hölderlin's Germanien, Andenken, Der Ister, and the corpuses of Rilke and Trakl). Described generically, the play of an author's principal gures characterizes the being, or rather, the coming to be of the poem, i.e., its Wesen. 11 For example, the interplay of Rilke's rhetoric of the heart, the open, nature, angels, lovers, and Orpheus stage the coming to pass of the being of the poem. Or, to invoke Hölderlin, gures like the river, the demigod, nature, divinities, and the owers of the mouth should be taken, when read as a constellation, as contributions to a gurative dance enacting the being of the poem. 12 What does it mean to take the poem at its word, however, particularly since Heidegger is so fond of claiming that the Ur-poem lies unspoken within an author's work? 13 According to "Sprache im Gedicht," one's reading must involve an Erläuterung, a "clari cation." "Because the poet's singular Ur-poem always remains within the unspoken, we can situate its site only in trying to point to it by means of what the individual poems speak. And for that reason each poem will be in need of clari cation" (UzS, 38). Uncovering an author's Ur-poem thus involves a reciprocal strategy wherein one construes an Ur-poem out of select poems and then returns what has been construed to other poems in order to test the delity of one's "exposition." 14 In his 1943 reading of Hölderlin's Der Ister, Heidegger terms the stuV of these construals "annotations," Anmerkungen. According to Heiddeger, these annotations are markers (Merkmale), signs set along textual paths that direct one towards an Ur-poem. Through annotations, Heidegger thus reads until his feel for an Ur-poem and each particular poem coincides. As he writes in June of 1943:
Was immer auch eine Erläuterung vermag und was sie nicht vermag, von ihr gilt stets dieses: damit das im Gedicht rein Gedichtes um einiges klarer dastehe, muß die erläuternde Rede sich und ihr Versuchtes jedesmal zerbrechen. Um des Gedichteten will muß die Erläuterung des Gedichtes danach trachten, sich selbst über üssig zu machen. Der letzte, aber auch der schwerste Schritt jeder Auslegung besteht darin, mit ihren Erläuterungen vor dem reinen Dastehen des Gedichtes zu verschwinden. . . . [If so] meinen wir beim wiederholenden Lesen, wir hatten die Gedichte schon immer so verstanden.
[Whatever else a clari cation can or cannot do, this always applies: in order that what is purely poetized [our Ur-poem] may stand within the poem a little more clearly, the clarifying speech, at each turn, must break itself and what it has attempted. For the sake of what is poetized [the Ur-poem] the clari cation of the poem must proceed in such a way that it makes itself super uous. The nal yet most diYcult step of every interpretation consists in this, to disappear with its clari cations before the pure standing of what is poetized [the Ur-poem]. . . . [If so] with repeated reading we'll suppose that we had always understood the poems in this way.] (EHD, 9) 15 The clari cation of the Erläuterung therefore should dissolve into the exposition of the Erörterung, exposing an Ur-poem which marks and gures the Ort of poetizing itself.
Heidegger's readings are not intended to revolutionize literary history or criticism, however. Instead, they aim at revolutionizing our dasein. Let us turn, then, to the question of poetic founding, keeping in view the ground we have covered, for it will turn out that this Ur-poem holds a measure for those who have come to the end of metaphysics.
II. An Added Dimension
The poets, so we believe, remind the philosophers, again and again, of the world's baÞ ing presence.
-Charles Simic
The key to poetic measure lies, I believe, in Heidegger's later discussions of "dwelling." In "Bauen, Wohnen, Denken," Heidegger claims that Wohnen involves the fundamental character (Grundzug ) of human beings, it is "the way in which mortals are upon the earth" (VA, 142; BW2, 350). Or: "Dwelling . . . is the fundamental relation of being according to which (demgemäß ) mortals are" (VA, 155; BW2, 362). More speci cally, "dwelling" names the way in which human beings undergo relations with themselves, the world, as well as Sein itself. In short, "dwelling" names our fundamental relation to the horizon of disclosure wherein beings appear, receive determinations, correspond to or elude determinations, etc. Dwelling is thus a matter of our Wesen, of how we come to be the beings we are. What, though, is the relation of "dwelling" to poetry? In ". . . dichterisch wohnet der Mensch . . ." Heidegger claims: "Poetizing [Dichten] is the originary allowance-of-dwelling [Wohnenlassen]" (VA, 196; PLT, 227) . At the heart of Wohnen, therefore, Heidegger nds poetizing. Or, to be more precise, that which brings us into relation with the horizon of disclosure wherein we dwell itself occurs or comes to pass as the lassen of a Dichten. Or, in yet other words, poetizing holds the measure for human dwelling. But what could this mean?
According to Heidegger, dwelling is intimately bound to "building," Bauen, and vise versa. Dwelling involves our standing within a horizon of disclosure, what Heidegger at one point terms the Dimension (VA, 189; PLT, 220). And yet, we are able to undergo disclosures if and only if the Dimension has been "measured" or "surveyed"vermessen (VA, 189; PLT, 221). In other words, the Dimension unfolds only in virtue of its being measured; that is, we dwell only in relation to some measure. But then, there can be no measuring-building unless we are already dwelling, unless we are already arising within a horizon of disclosure. As Heidegger writes in Bauen, Wohnen, Denken: "Only when we are able to dwell can we build" (VA, 155; BW2, 362). The two are equiprimordial. Why? Consider the reverse. How could pure Dimension be disclosed? What would a dwelling-place be without a here or there? Put simply, there is no Dimension per se, only a given Dimension, one already measured. But then, neither is there building apart from some Dimension, apart from some horizonsuch a building would have no dimensions. 16 This interdependence between building and dwelling is crucial for an understanding of poetry's role in our dwelling, for poetizing is, according to Heidegger, building par excellence. [But dwelling happens only if poetizing takes place and comes to pass (sich ereignet und west), and indeed in the way of . . . the measure-taking (Maß-Nahme) for all measuring (messen). This measure-taking is itself the most proper, not a bare gauging (Abmessen) with ready-made yardsticks (Maßstäben) for the preparation of maps. Likewise, poetizing is not building in the sense of raising and tting buildings. Rather, poetizing, as the most proper appraisal (Ermessen) of the dimension of dwelling, is inceptual building. Before anything else, poetizing admits the dwelling of human beings into its Wesen [the manner of its coming to pass, or its essence]. Poetizing is the originary allowanceof-dwelling (Wohnenlassen).] (VA, 196) Poetizing is an arranging of the Dimension at its "inception," its Anfang, an event of originary guration. Dichten is thus originary "measure-taking." It does not simply measure a given dimension or area, but poetizes the measure of a horizon of disclosure itself. Now it is through this "most proper appraisal," this Ermessen, that poetizing builds a site for human dwelling. In arranging a Dimension, in providing a Maß, Dichten out ts a dwelling-place, as it were, such that we might dwell there.
At this point, at least two questions press themselves upon us. First, what is involved in "appraising" a dimension, or "surveying" it? Second, how does this activity enable dwelling? Let us begin with the former.
As noted earlier, one cannot apprehend the Dimension as if it were something present. Appraisal is thus not a rare ed form of poetic intuition. Instead, it must take place along side building, which in this case involves the production of poetic determinations. Let us consider an example, but one closer to our own period than the mytho-poetic musings of Hölderlin. A few years ago, after an already distinguished career, A. R. Ammons published Garbage, a poem ironically described at its outset as "that great poem the world is waiting for" and as one of "those celestial guidance systems." 17 The poem, dense and rich beyond what I shall say, presents us with a gure, a garbage mound, "which is about the pre-socratic idea of the / dispositional axis from stone to, wind / to stone," which is to say, it is about the generation of form, matter, and sense, of persons, twigs, and waste, of thumb nails, paper plates, and uranium deposits; all to say, it is about what is (G, 20). The conceit works by taking the transmutations that govern the 'life' of the mound as the play of a necessity that moves through and animates all things as "eternity's glint: it all wraps back round, / into and out of form, palpable and impalpable" (G, 22). And Ammons is rigorous in his deployment of this conceit, refusing to reduce it to the material or the spiritual, insisting instead that it includes both. 18 Moreover, the work of transmutation along the "dispositional axis" that he terms a "spindle of energy" never becomes a thing among the things produced. Rather, the poem announces: "only born die, and if something is / born or new, then that is not it, that is not / the it: the it is the indiVerence of all the / diVerences, the nothingness of all the poised / somethings, the nest issues of energy in which boulders and dead stars oat" (G, 27). And nally, Ammons brilliantly gures his conceit by refusing to employ periods, opting instead for the colon (:)-a graphic instance of the "dispositional axis," the hinge upon which the poem's own sentences swing, the shoot through which all waste must travel. 19 Back to our question as to the nature of poetic appraisal. Using Ammons as an example, we should begin by claiming that "appraisal," Ermessen, occurs within the production of lyrical determinations, taking "lyric" in its most extravagant sense: poetry, neither narratively based nor dramatic in form, which grapples with concerns and questions considered essential to human existence. 20 And yet, the production of names does not in itself constitute poetic appraisal. If it did, Dichten would in fact be analogous to the "raising and t-ting of buildings," something Heidegger denies, claiming instead that Ermessen involves anfängliche Bauen, "inceptual building." But then, what does it involve?
Let us consider this appeal to the Anfang. In his reading of Hölderlin's Germanien, Heidegger distinguishes between the Beginn and an Anfang, tethering the latter to the Ursprung, the origin. A Beginn marks the actual onset of something, for example (and it is Heidegger's), a change in the weather "begins" with an event, say a storm. The Anfang, however, lies in the atmospheric changes that lead to the storm. Thus a "Beginn ist jenes, womit etwas anhebt, Anfang das, woraus etwas entspringt," that is, a "Beginn is that with which something commences, an Anfang that from which something originates, leaps forth" (GA 39: 3). The Anfang thus marks a gathering of elements that results in a certain event; it is the Ur-sprung, the source from which some event leaps forth, "ent-springt." 21 If Dichten is anfängliche Bauen, then it must "appraise" the Dimension at the scene of its emergence, in its leaping forth. But if the Dimension only comes to be alongside of a "surveying," a Vermessen, in order to catch the Dimension at the scene of its emergence one must catch it as it opens in and alongside its surveyance. Or to use the language of the Kunstwerkes piece, the task involves "appraising" the "clearing of openness" (the Lichtung ) within the "arranging" (the Einrichtung ) of "sites lled by present beings [einer von Anwesenedem erfullten Stätte]" (H, 48; BW2, 186). But is not poetry responsible for the surveyance? Indeed. Thus appraising involves tracking the gathering of the Dimension within the poem's own language. In the Ammons poem, this would involve tracking the gathering of those fundamental, poetic names, names like "garbage," "dispositional axis," "spindle of energy," etc., which purportedly "survey" the Dimension of human dwelling.
On the reading being developed here, the claim is that poetic appraisal, Ermessen, takes place when the names that arrange and establish the Dimension or an Open-region are tracked with regards to their own emergence. But how is a poem to do this? Said briskly, by poetizing naming itself, or rather, by poetizing poetizing. In the Ammons poem, this occurs when the gure of the garbage mound, with its endless transmutations, turns back upon the poem itself, as in the following passages: "there is a mound, / too, in the poet's mind dead language is hauled / oV to and burned down on, the energy held and / haped into new turns and clusters, the mind / strengthened by what it strengthens" (G, 20) . And less directly: "but we are natural: nature, not / we, gave rise to us: we are not, though, though / natural, divorced from higher, ner congurations: / tissues and holograms of energy circulate in / us and seek and nd representations of themselves / outside us, so that we can participate in / celebrations high and know reaches of feeling / and sight and thought that penetrate (really / penetrate) far, far beyond these our wet cells, / right on up past our stories, the planets, moons / and other bodies . . . oh yes, in the abiding where / mind but nothing else abides, the eternal, / until it turns into another pear or sun sh" (G, [21] [22] . And nally, as we've already noted, this poem too is garbage, punctuation and all, a Schwingungsraum of cesspool choirs.
But where is the clearing of openness in all this? How does this recoil of the garbage gure nger the rim of an openness whose clearance enables its own guration? A diYcult question, for here assertions fail, begging the question, overlooking their own Anfang, forgetting their own reliance upon names, upon an open already cleared. The mute limits of assertion recall the fate of the Urpoem's articulation of the Ort of poetizing. In its re exivity, the Ur-poem neither expresses nor represents, at the level of content, its own gathering, for such forms presuppose what they would provide. Should one conclude, therefore, that "appraisal" is not itself a naming? This seems too hasty. 22 Does not the Ammons poem direct us towards its source, and with names: "a spindle of energy," a "dispositional axis," the movement of matter into spirit into matter, ellipses dotting the dance? And does not it also push past these names to "eternity's glint," even drawing when speaking fails, i.e., ":"? Most certainly, but we must not be misled, for no one gure, line, phrase, or name (or sum of them all) traces the way in which the open is cleared. Instead, the intersection of all these forces directs us towards their scene of emergence, their Ort, that is, dances of gures push past themselves to their horizonal rim, where they fall oV, taking us with them: "dance / peopling the centers and distances, the faraway / galactic slurs even, luminescences, plasmas, / those burns, the same principle: but here on / those heights, terns and ies avoid the closest / precincts of the ame, the terrifying transformations, / the disappearances of anything of interest, / morsel, gobbet, trace of maple syrop, fat worm" (G, 31). 23 To dwell, however, there is no avoiding the "closest precincts of the ame."
Poetizing, as measure-taking, appraises the Dimension in poetizing its own emergence by waxing lyrical and reaching past these ourishes. Articulating the clearing of the Dimension, poetizing tracks the emergence of its own guration. But note: this is precisely what takes place in the Ur-poem-a poetizing of poetry, a poetizing of the Anfang, of language's leap into poetry. Can we claim, therefore, that the poetic "appraisal" of the Dimension takes place in the language of the Ur-poem, in that language's turn towards an appraising guration of its own Ort? But this rings absurd, for it seems to bind humans to the being of poetry. And yet, Heidegger has claimed that human beings dwell poetically. Where is the sense in this? I think it hinges on Heidegger's claim that one cannot think the Wesen of any being except through a language of Wesen, and thus necessarily upon some account of the Wesen of language. In ". . . dichterisch wohnet der Mensch . . .," he writes:
Woher nimmt der Mensch überhaupt den Anspruch, in das Wesen einer Sache zu gelangen? Der Mensch kann diesen Anspruch nur dorther nehmen, von woher er ihn empfängt. Er empfängt ihn aus dem Zuspruch der Sprache. Freilich nur dann, wenn er und solange er das eigene Wesen der Sprache schon achtet. . . . Denn eigentlich spricht die Sprache. Der Mensch spricht erst und nur, insofern er der Sprache entspricht, indem er auf ihren Zuspruch hört. (VA, 183-84; PLT, [From where do humans, as a whole, make the claim (Anspruch) of having arrived at the Wesen of something? Humans can make such a claim only from where they have received it. Humans receive such a claim from the exhortation (Zuspruch ) of language. But of course, only when and so long as they abide by the most proper Wesen of language. . . . Because, properly speaking, language speaks. Humans speak rst and only insofar as they co-respond (entsprechen) to language, listening to its exhortation.]
Generically, we could say that humans dwell by co-responding to a horizon of disclosure, by being always already amid disclosure. But our entry into this "midst" only comes to pass when we co-respond to the "exhortation" of language, that is, we come to be among disclosures in a co-responding to the address of language. And thus it is alongside of a response to the exhortation of language that we arrive at the Wesen of something, including ourselves. 24 Concerning the Ur-poem, then, my claim is that by "appraising" its own emergence into language, the Ur-poem engages and gures a relation between its own determinations and their emergence into language that unveils or "surveys" the Wesen of language. In so engaging the Wesen of language, the Urpoem thus provides an encounter with language, one through which all wesentlich inquiries might travel, including the pursuit of the originary scene of human dwelling. In other words, the Ur-poem produces an Ursprache, a language which "appraises" the Dimension wherein all other disclosures come to pass. 25 When Heidegger claims, therefore, that the "co-responding through which humans properly listen to the exhortation of language is that saying that speaks in the element of poetizing," we can regard poetizing here as the doubling turn of a language tracking its own originary emergence. We might even say that a "proper listening" to the exhortation of language involves a gurative "appraisal," and that this is precisely what the poetizing of the Ur-poem accomplishes. 26 It seems that the self-guring play of the Ur-poem might in fact be bound to the question of human dwelling. And yet, what does Heidegger mean when he claims that this form of poetizing "allows" human dwelling, that Ur-poetry involves a Wohnenlassen? This emphasis on lassen rings in obvious contrast to a rhetoric of causality. If we are to understand how an Ur-poem allows us to dwell, we will have to work our way out of some common intuitions concerning the nature of production. One can see why Heidegger would not want to speak of poetry as the causal force behind human dwelling. Such a notion is wedded to the notion of eYcient causality, a concept Heidegger considers a perversion. 27 More importantly, eYcient causality involves two present forces meeting one another, resulting in some eVect. Where in such a schema can one nd, however, the subtle play of Lichtung and Einrichtung? For all intents and purposes, the event wherein the open is cleared, an event assumed in all relations, causal or otherwise, is overlooked when the rhetoric of eYcient causality is employed. But revealing the clearing of the open is the key to poetic building. In fact, the Ur-poem only nds its way to its own Ort by attending to the clearing of the open that underwrites its own emergence into language. It seems clear, then, that poetic building does not cause some Dimension to unfold as Hume's billiard balls cause, or seem to cause, one another to bound along the rails. But how are we to understand this?
Let us work more carefully with "Die Frage nach Der Technik." After refusing to consider the concept of the cause within the framework of eYcient causality, Heidegger writes: [Causa, casus, belongs to the verb cadere, to fall, and means that which eVects [things] such that, as a result, such and such comes about. The doctrine of the four causes comes from Aristotle. Within and for the realm of Greek thought, however, everything for which later ages search among the Greeks with the conception and term "causality" has simply nothing to do with working-upon and eVecting. What we name "cause," what the Romans name causa, is called by the Greeks aition, that to which something else is indebted. The four causes, all belonging to one another, are ways of being-responsiblefor-something.] 28 First, note that the issue is the Ursache, the rst thing, the originary matter. What is at issue then is the origin, the Ursprung. One should expect to confront, therefore, matters concerning what must have occurred in the rst place given that things are the way they are. 29 Second, Heidegger, with characteristic and exaggerated severity, is attempting to wrest the notion of causality away from the Latin world in order to give it a Greek spin. 30 Third, he translates the thought of the Ursache within terms of indebtedness, even guilt-Verschulden, which Lovitt has rendered as "being-responsible-for-something." 31 Now in its most general sense, Heidegger understands Verschulden to involve "bringing something to presence." More precisely, the four ways of being-responsible-forsomething have "den Grundzug dieses Anlassens in die Ankunft," that is "the fundamental characteristic of releasing something into its arrival" (VA, 14; BW2, 316). Why the emphasis on lassen? As I noted earlier, I think it has to do with Heidegger's attempt to recover a sense of the clearing of openness within the event of presencing. If we set at the heart of causality this notion of "releasing something into its arrival," we engage several questions. First, we render presencing an event, thus provoking us to seek the origin of what has come to pass. Second, we are made aware of the temporality of presencing in the fact that presencing happens. Third, the moment of release adds a dimension to the interaction of those forces or beings that in fact emerge into presence. And it is this added dimension that concerns us here, for it marks both (a) the dimension of the Ort as a gathering force at work in the language of the poem and (b) the dimension of the Dimension from which poetic building takes its leave and to which it returns human dwelling.
We might deepen this discussion by noting that Heidegger eventually claims that the essence of Kausalität is Veranlassung, meaning "to occasion" but also to "call forth" (VA, 14; BW2, 316). This means, I take it, that Heidegger would have us regard the inception or origin of something as a "calling-forth" of something into its arrival, into presence, an arrival we earlier described in our discussion of the Anfang as an entspringen, a "leaping-forth." According to Heidegger, then, "to occasion" something is not to produce it ex nihilo, or to run into it thus redirecting its passage through space, but to gather and start it down some path, to direct its arrival in a certain way, to call it forth to a certain way of being. 32 Now this should recall our earlier discussion of the Anfang and the storm. The Anfang is not the Ur-production and ignition of the storm's form, matter, and end, but a gathering of those moments, a gathering that allows them to arrive into presence. Why "allow"? Because the gathering is not itself a present force among those gathered, but the scene of their convergence, or even what calls them to convene. 33 Perhaps we are in a better position now to make sense of the claim: "Poetizing is the originary allowance-of-dwelling (Wohnenlassen)." In allowing us to dwell, poetizing does not simply erect a dwelling, leaving us to worry about the perspicuity of our view. Instead, it calls us forth to a site wherein we might dwell. Now recall that dwelling, wohnen, names the way in which humans undergo relations with things themselves, even the event of presencing itself. As Heidegger says, it is our way or manner of being upon the earth. To say then that poetizing allows us to dwell is to say that poetizing calls us forth into this way of being upon the earth; that is, it enables us to arrive into presence in a certain way. More speci cally, it allows us to arrive into presence within the appraising-guration of the Ur-poem. On the one hand, the Ur-poem arranges a Dimension through the interplay of its lyrical determinations: river, demigod, divinities, owers (Hölderlin); angel, heart, Orpheus, rose (Rilke); twilight, silence, madness, wall ( Trakl); spindle, colon, trash, and more trash (Ammons) . This is the moment of Einrichtung, of building and arranging across an open region. On the other hand, the Ur-poem reaches past these determinations to the point of their and its emergence, to the Ort, the "tip of the spear" around which "everything runs together." And in so reaching, it unveils the clearing of openness, the Lichtung, which opens the Dimension within which (a) the language of the poem unfolds and (b) an open region is arranged. And it is this exposure of the opening open, through and beyond the Ur-poem's own lyrical determinations, which calls us forth to a certain kind of presencing. More speci cally, the Ur-poem's exposure of the Lichtung tags us with a language attuned to the clearing of the open that foregrounds, even underwrites, the very emergence of things.
An example. In Garbage we hear: "holy, holy, / holy, the driver [of a garbage truck] cries and icks his cigarette / in a spiritual swoop that oats and oats before / it touches ground: here, driver knows, / where the consummations gather, where the disposal / ows out of form, where the last translations / cast away their immutable bits and scraps; / its of steel, shivers of bottle and tumbler, / here is the gateway to beginning, here the portal / of renewing change, the birdshit, even, melding / enrichingly in with debris, a loam for the roots / of placenta: oh nature, the man on the edge of the cardboard-laced cliVs exclaims, that there could be a straightaway from the toxic past into / the fusion-lit reaches of a coming time!" (G, [28] [29] . It is this "gateway to the beginning," or rather Ursprung, which concerns us, this "portal." The Ur-poem calls us forth into this portal, sets us there -allows us to undergo disclosure under its canopy. But the issue is not simply the open region of disclosure, as if that were the scene of human dwelling. As we have noted repeatedly, there is no such thing -we are never simply there, in the open. The double saying of the Ur-poem is thus the key, for human dwelling is precisely doubled in this way: present, alongside others and things, but also among them, among "this" and "that," which is to say, just past them (and ourselves) as well, both "mist" and "matter."
III. Exploring the Open Ranges
The skreak and skritter of evening gone And grackles gone and sorrows of the sun, The sorrows of the sun, too gone . . . the moon and moon, The yellow moon of words about the nightingale In measureless measures, not a bird for me But the name of a bird and the name of a nameless air I have never-shall never hear. And yet beneath The stillness that comes to me out of this, beneath The stillness of everything gone, and being still, Being and sitting still, something resides, Some skreaking and skittering residuum, And grates these evasions of the nightingale Though I have never -shall never hear that bird. And the stillness is in the key, all of it is, The stillness is all in the key of that desolate sound.
-Wallace Stevens, "Autumn Refrain" 34 If the Ur-poem in fact calls us to a scene of dwelling through its gurative appraisals, one must ask: How should this guration be regarded once it has been built? What does it mean to dwell through an Ur-poem? What is a Wohnung? Or, how does an Ursprache engage and inform a Dimension of disclosure? Let us begin with some preliminary observations. If our Wohnung is founded in the language of an Ur-poem, then the gures of that poetry mark the limits of the horizon of disclosure even as they gesture past those limits. In this regard, then, an Ursprache is akin to Kant's notion in the Critique of Pure Reason of Sinnlichkeit, "sensibility," the a priori arena wherein objects of intuition are given to us (A19/B33). And yet, the productive and responsive play of the language of the poem is not the work of a transcendental subject. Instead of delimiting the horizon of disclosure within the intuitional folds of space and time, the Ur-poem itself gures the Dimension of human existence. For example, if we follow Hölderlin as read by Heidegger in the 1950s, we will nd ourselves in a dwelling built around the play of the Geviert, the fourfold, a constellation of earth and sky, divinities and mortals. Or, to invoke Rilke, our Wohnung might be gured in the spherical play of erotic life turning into death, turning into life.
While the analogy with Kant has obvious limits, it does underscore one central fact: Ur-poetry does not create a world thing by thing, but determines or occasions (recalling our discussion of Veranlassung) how a "world worlds," how the play of its presences and absences swirl about us. In other words, in allowing us to encounter the Wesen of language at the point of its inception, neither the Ur-poem nor the poet name discrete things. As Heidegger writes, the fact that poetic language gures our horizons of disclosure "never means that language, in any old meaning picked up at will, immediately and de nitively supplies us with the transparent Wesen of the matter like some object ready to be used" (VA, 184; PLT, 216). Why? As we've seen, the poetry unfolding here neither expresses nor represents the Ort of its and our gathering. In other words, it is nonpropositional; no predicates are ascribed to individuals (e.g., this rock is garbage) or classes (all / some rocks are garbage). Heidegger is not proposing that poetic names somehow magically summon or control the "essence" of things. Or to put the emphasis elsewhere, this is not a referential poetry, not a poetry that aspires to name anything at all, but one that guratively traces the rim of its and our being.
But how? How does the language of Ur-poetry stand in relation to the Dimension of human dwelling? One might think, following Schürmann, who also begins with Kantian intuitions about the nature of human dwelling, that Ur-poetry supplies "inceptual categories of presencing" according to which disclosures take place. Schürmann believes that properly understood, the language of "category" captures the way in which building and dwelling intertwine. He writes: "If it is understood that the traditional term 'category' is here shorn not only of all ousiological and subjectivist connotations, but also of all references to phenomenal regions . . . if it is understood, in other words, that categorein, 'to accuse,' no longer means 'to address oneself to entities as such,' but to address presencing and its manifold ways of diVering from the economies of presence, then nothing prohibits rehabilitating this venerable word." 35 While there is a certain attractiveness to Schürmann's tack, its emphasis on the structural is troubling, for it leaves the event of guration no longer poetic. In a way, Heidegger anticipates this trouble when he claims in the Beiträge that the language of categories remains inextricably tied to the language of Urteil, judgment (GA 65: 135-36). This marks a problem because within what claims to be originary, it re-inscribes a more original governing agency. In terms of the language of the Ur-poem, this would mean that poetic building is actually the product of a deeper, extra-poetic agency, and Heidegger is quite clear that with regards to the language of the poem, the origin lies within poetic language itself.
On rst glance, Schürmann seems to elude our worry, for his central claim is that the rx® of these categories is in fact an-archic. But does not categorical language re-inscribe a judging agent into presencing? In a fascinating way, this re-inscription occurs in Schürmann's own discussion. In elaborating his anarchic categories of presencing, Schürmann is compelled to chastise Heidegger for what he terms a "category mistake" (HBA, 176-77). On the one hand, Schürmann claims, Heidegger rightly treats lñgow as a structural antecedent to the event of presencing. On the other hand, however, Heidegger also proceeds as if lñgow marked an actual, historical antecedent to the event of presencing.
And this, Schürmann continues, confuses a category with its application. And yet, how could such be avoided when the issue is presencing? If categories are to gure disclosure, one cannot keep them "categorically" distinct from what they gure, for otherwise one will to have appeal to a dhmiourgñw who brings together the categories with the stuV to be fashioned according to their lights. And this is precisely, I take it, the heart of Heidegger's worry in the Beiträgecategories remain parasitic upon some agent who applies them. We need to reach past a rhetoric of categorein, therefore, in order fathom the work of Urpoetic gurations.
I am inclined to nd in Schürmann the limits of our Kantian intuitions regarding the way in which Ur-poetry comes to arrange an open Dimension of disclosure. Perhaps we might draw a more productive lead from a source less ensnared in the traditions of German Idealism. In order to de-subjectivize and de-transcendentalize poetic building altogether, Andrzej Warminski has suggested that we understand the gurative power of the poetic word in terms of catachresis, that is, in terms of a certain class of names that are thoroughly metaphorical, e.g., mountain face. He opts for this term because "it is the gure of all guration; but in being such, it is a monstrous gure in so far as it un-says its referential pretensions, that is, undoes them." 36 Monstrosity arises because within the very idea of catachresis a naming lurks that occurs in deferral; that is, built into the name "mountain face" is the thought that this part of the mountain bears its name only through the intercession of a third, and this third defers inquiry into the origin of poetic building; i.e., such inquiry only encounters a clearing of the openness that enables, but is not present in, the language of the poem, except perhaps as a "stillness keyed in a desolate sound," to recall Stevens' "Autumn Refrain." Following Warminski, therefore, we could regard poetic building as the work of catachresis, the presentation of in nitely deferring metaphors.
Warminski's tack troubles me, however, for it draws the language of Wesen outside of the work of poetizing and into the history of poetics. Moreover, it leaves us asking about the Wesen of this term "catachresis" that proposes to name the guring work of language. Now Warminski is shrewd enough to anticipate this concern, and thus refuses to regard catachresis as a name at all. Instead, it eludes the realm of semantics as a "syntactical marker," a "syntactical plug," a site in "language's material conditions of possibility" (RII, xxxxxxiii, liii, 70). This position is untenable, however, for two reasons. First, the very distinction between syntax and semantics is a semantic one, and thus the logic of Warminski's claim fails from the outset to escape the binds of semantics, even though he insists that this sense of "syntax" is a nondialectical other to semantics. Second, Warminski oddly refuses to interrogate the Wesen of his own language of "syntax" and "language's material conditions of possibility." Instead, he proceeds as if these were not names themselves. I think his attempt to account for the work of poetic guration ultimately fails to engage the problem, therefore, or rather, it fails to accept that poetic names, semantically charged, are the only originary signs we have.
While Warminski's turn to the rhetoric of poetics does not, I believe, allow us to come to terms with the nature of poetic dwelling, his emphasis upon the "monstrosity" of poetic guration merits our attention, for it captures a key element in the drama of poetic building and dwelling. In the Kunstwerkes piece, Heidegger writes:
Je einsamer das Werk, festgestellt in die Gestalt, in sich steht, je reiner es alle Bezüge zu den Menschen zu lösen scheint, um so einfacher tritt der Stoß, das solches Werk ist, ins OVene, um so wesentlicher ist das Ungeheure aufgestoßen und das bislang geheure Scheinende umgestoßen. Aber dieses vielfältige Stoßen hat nichts Gewaltsames; denn je reiner das Werk selbst in die durch es selbst eröVnete OVenheit des Seienden entrückt ist, um so einfacher rückt es uns in diese OVenheit ein und so zugleich aus dem Gewöhnlichen heraus. Dieser Verrückung folgen, heißt: die gewohnten Bezüge zur Welt und zur Erde verwandeln und fortan mit allem geläu gen Tun und Schätzen, Kennen und Blicken ansichhalten, um in der im Werk geschehenden Wahrheit zu verweilen. (H, 52-53; BW2, 191) [The more solitarily the work stands on its own, established in a form, seeming to let go, cleanly, all ties to human being, the more simply does it strike into the open that such a work is, the more essentially is the monstrous thrown open and what was long-familiar over thrown. But this manifold striking and throwing is nothing violent; for the more purely the work itself is carried oV into the openness of beings, what it itself has opened, the more easily does it throw us into this openness and, simultaneously, out of the commonplace. To submit to this displacement, that means: to transform accustomed ties to world and earth and, henceforth, to keep oneself from all well-known ways of acting and assessing, knowing and viewing, in order to tarry with the truth occurring in the work.] 37 This is a remarkably rich passage. Let me note several things. First, if we accept that "truth" here refers to what is disclosed by the work, what comes to unconcealment in the work, then it would seem that the truth with which we are to tarry is that which the work reveals as "monstrous," the Ungeheure. But what is monstrous here? Truth, that is, unconcealment itself. In this open region there must be, therefore, a being in which openness takes its stand and attains constancy]" (H, 47; BW2, 186). 38 As I see it, the point is that the originary or inceptual site of disclosure, what we have regarded as an Ort of poetic guration and the open dimensions of human dwelling, comes to presence in a being, in the presencing of a being. (In our context, this being would be a poetic determination.) And yet, this dependency on a presencing being (or a word) conceals the moment of Lichtung, of clearing; that is, a being or poetic determination cannot re-present the clearing of that openness that enables it. Thus: "Die Wahrheit west als solche im Gegeneinander von Lichtung und zweifacher Verbergung [Truth, as such, essentially comes to pass in the opposition of clearing and double concealing]" (H, 47; BW2, 185) . 39 But what is monstrous in this? Let us consider three things. 40 First, a vast power is at play in the work of art insofar as it brings about unconcealment, truth, in an originary fashion. We are discussing here the gathering of a horizon of disclosure, a calling-forth of something to its essence, a gathering from the "extremes" to recall our earlier discussion of the Ort (UzS, 38; OWL, 159-60). At work in the work of art, therefore, in the Ur-poem, is a monstrous power of sorts, and Heidegger's appeal to the "monstrous" conveys this. 41 Second, the sheer un-representability of the clearing of openness is tinged with the monstrous, but in the sense of the extraordinary. Concerning Hölderlin's use of "Ungeheure," Heidegger writes of the Außergewöhnliche, that which is not simply nonordinary, but ungraspable within the realm of the ordinary (GA 53: 77-78; DI, 63-64). In other words, the event of unconcealment cannot be accounted for as something either zuhanden, ready-to-hand, or vorhanden, present-at-hand. In fact, the event of unconcealment is never "at hand" at all, and thus not a matter for re-presentation. With regard to truth as l®yeia, John Sallis has written of a "divergence from nature in nature," of a force at work in nature that is not present in nature. 42 In this context, I think we could speak of "a divergence from the ordinary within the ordinary," and stress the within, for as we have noted, "in the open region there must be a being in which openness takes its stand and attains constancy."
A third moment concerns the most obvious sense of the monstrous: the frightful. Heidegger himself notes that the emergence of the monstrous subjects us to displacement. Note the strength in the word Verrückung: displace, shift, disarrange. And then, to be verrückt is to be mad, crazy, insane, cracked. As the monstrous is thrown open, we are jolted out of ourselves. More speci cally, we are thrown out of accustomed ways of "acting and assessing, knowing and viewing." In other words, the emergence of the monstrous brings with it a kind of exile, a banishment from what, until then, had carried us along. And yet, Heidegger downplays this aspect of the monstrous, claiming that it is "nothing violent." On the one hand, I can appreciate his resistance. If the work of art were viewed as violent, if its transformative power were regarded as a cause, then we again would lose the moment of the clearing in the arrangement of an open region of disclosure. Also, I think Heidegger is at pains to free the power of the work of art (and unconcealment itself ) from human subjectivity. As he notes, a work of art draws us towards truth the more cleanly it cuts "all ties to human being." But if we stress the violent nature of the work's impact, we draw the work back into a relation with us and run the risk of reducing its power to reader response, thus losing the originary altogether. 43 And yet, one cannot deny the transformative power of exile. Why, even as it opens the openness of beings, the work itself is "carried oV " into that openness, that is, it is entrückt. As with Verrückung, this is a powerful word. Not only does it suggest being carried oV, but it also connotes ecstasy and rapture. It is as if the work, in being drawn towards its own Ort, drew us as well, called to us, thus carrying us oV in the wake of a move towards its source. And from the perspective of the everyday, of accustomed, habitual comfort, this can be a moment of violence, of uprooting, Heidegger's disclaimer notwithstanding.
This language of the monstrous highlights, I think, an integral moment in poetic founding. Recall that the Ur-poem enables us to dwell because, in exposing its own Ort, it calls us to the originary site of disclosure by allowing us to attend to the essence of language. And in doing so, it provides an Ursprache that gures that site, that is, which brings or gathers all determinations to the scene of their emergence. Now, as we have just seen, something monstrous is at work, and both within the call to the originary site, and the site itself, for therein lurks: (1) a double-concealment amidst a powerful unconcealment, (2) an event not translatable into rhetorics of presence, re-presentation, or expression, (3) a moment of ecstatic exile from what had been ordinary, and (4) a no doubt frightful encounter with the uncanniness of disclosure per se. On the one hand, then, the Ur-poem calls us forth to a site of dwelling, allowing us to tarry there (verweilen). On the other hand, it also jolts us, yanks us away from the customary. Alongside poetic founding, we should expect, therefore, to encounter exile, and perhaps a certain kind of madness.
Given this emphasis upon monstrous excesses in the open region to which the Ur-poem calls us, one cannot help but wonder about the importance of any given determination in the work of poetic founding. After all, if the point is just to announce the abysmal grounding of beings, it is not clear that any founding poem need have more than one monstrous gure. This is a reasonable question, but it conceals an important misunderstanding as well as a profound limit to the language we have employed thus far. We tend to speak and write as if the open region of beings, the horizon of disclosure, were a place through which all beings traveled. If this were the case, then we could rest with a few names that locate it, point it out, if only under erasure. But such a picture is misleading, for the open region of beings is less a place than an event of clearing that accompanies all presencing. The clearing of openness is not some particular thing in need of a clever name, but an event that accompanies and haunts all names, all gures. An Ursprache is thus not a collection of names for some monstrous element of the world, but a play of gures that unveils the world in its monstrous worlding. Or, in less dramatic form, the Ur-poem provides us with a set of gures whose interaction and play enable us to engage beings in the event of their presencing and not just as present beings. The gures of the Ur-poem thus accompany particular disclosures like shrouds, drawing them back towards the originary site of disclosure. And this is the point-not simply to point out the diVerential nature of disclosure, but to provide a language that can bring an entire range of disclosures back into the folds of this diVerential site.
This section's initial question is still with us, however. How should we regard the gures that make up an Ursprache once they are set into a form and begin to gather disclosures within their monstrous reach? In other words, what does it mean to speak, or to speak within, such a language? Having rejected the paths oVered by Schürmann and Warminski, what are we to say about Ur-poetry? I think we might take our leave from a determination invoked in Heidegger's 1942 course on Hölderlin's Andenken. In that course, Heidegger regards what is poetized, the Gedichtete (our Ur-poem) as the product of a dichtende Wort, a "poetic word" that überdichtet, "over-poetizes" (as one might overrun) the language of the poem. More speci cally, it "öVnet und verschließt einen Reichtum, der unerschöp ich ist, weil er der Art des Anfänglichen und d.h. des Einfachen hat [opens and secures an abundance that is inexhaustible because it has an inceptual, and that means simple, character]" (GA 52: 13). The dichtende Wort calls the language of the poem to an abundance, but in the sense of a "wealth of opportunity." And it is this wealth of opportunity that concerns us. If you recall, the site of human dwelling involves the ways in which human beings undergo disclosure, that is, it involves our relations or ties to the earth and world, our "ways of acting and assessing, knowing and viewing" (H, 53; BW2, 191). 44 The site of human dwelling is thus a site of opportunity, of possible ways of engaging beings as they come to presence, e.g., faces, stones, rivers, trash bins, dingoes, cottage cheese, even poems. Given this, I think the key to understanding the existential force of Ur-poetry lies in this abundance.
In explicating the nature of poetic abundance, Heidegger writes of Schwingungsräume, what I earlier translated as "ranges of vibration." 45 What is striking about this term is its musical connotations-chords and strings vibrating, producing ranges of sound. And these connotations are not limited to this word. Across Heidegger's texts, one nds musical gures. In Der Satz vom Grund, he refers to the Tonart, the "tonality" of the principle of suYcient reason, and views his accentuation of moments therein, e.g., the copula, as Betonungen, "intonations" (SVG, 91-92 and 86; PR, 50 and 46). 46 Likewise, in a late reading of Hölderlin, he focuses upon the Grundton of a verse, though one can nd this language as well in "Sprache im Gedicht" and "Der Satz der Identität" (VA, 185;
UzS, 78; ID, [12] [13] . And then, the notion of a Grundstimmung is rife with musical senses given the verb stimmen can mean "to tune an instrument." Finally, Heidegger regards the gure of the art work, within which truth comes to pass, as a kind of fugue. Of a work's Gestalt, he writes: "Sie ist das Gefüge, als welche der Riß sich fügt. Der gefügte Riß is die Fuge des Scheinens der Wahrheit [Figure is the fugal structure in which the rift composes itself. This composed rift is the fugue of truth's shining]" (H, 50; BW2, 189). 47 Where is all of this heading? I want to claim that the Ur-poem animates human dwelling like a tonal scale animates a work written within its con nes. In other words, the Urpoem institutes "ranges of vibration" that eVectively tune disclosures such that they and we are brought back to the site of our mutual emergence as we leap or sound forth.
Consider the matter this way. A given poetic gure marks a Grundton, a "fundamental tone": for example, Rilke's "angel," Hölderlin's "river," Trakl's "leprosy." Now within a given corpus, several gures come together to produce a tonality, a tonal range, what I take to a Schwingungsraum. For example, we could speak of the tonality of Ammons's poem in terms of matter, spirit, the dispositional axis, garbage, ":," energy, etc. When we do, it is crucial to prioritize the interplay of the whole rather than assemble the gures in a cumulative fashion. In other words, no one word speaks on its own. 48 With this play of gures in tow, I think we can understand the Ur-poem's monstrous force within human dwelling as we do the force of a tonal scale within a given piece of music. Just as every piece and every note within those pieces sounds out within a tonal scale, so each disclosure enters the scene of human dwelling having taken its leave from the tonal backdrop of an Ur-music. 49 Thus every particular, say, my hand, or my toes moving in my shoes, or the view from my window, some voices down the hall, or the milk souring in my refrigerator while my nieces dance and sing in Indiana-each would have a place within the range of vibration that ows from a gurative tonality.
If we follow the view being sketched here, and regard poetic founding as the institution of gurative tonalities within the scene of human dwelling, we will have to regard these tonalities as nonreferential. That is, the Ur-music of the Ur-poem must be a matter of absolute music. The term "absolute music" has an interesting and rich history, one tied to a legitimation crisis concerning purely instrumental music. 50 Most generally, the term re ects a commitment on the part of theorists like Eduard Hanslick to liberate instrumental music from the derivative status it held well into the eighteenth century. That such a liberation would be necessary may strike twentieth century listeners as strange, but even in the nineteenth century, people like Wagner argued that instrumental music remained incomplete without the presence of word-driven texts. At the heart of this notion of absolute music there lurks, therefore, the idea that instrumental music should not be subordinated to other modes of artistic production, e.g., the plays of the human voice, the lyrics of a song, or to dance or drama (as in ballet and opera). And in a more complicated way, the drive towards absolute music envisions a music uninterested in musically enacting narratives (as Richard Strauss does in his Death and Trans guration) or representing extramusical contents (as Vivaldi's Four Seasons purports to do). In shedding these latter binds, "absolute music" functions as a contrast term to "program music," music that develops a subject matter (e.g., the story of Don Juan) within its own, musical language (e.g., a symphonic poem). In other words, in trying to distinguish itself from program music, absolute music draws itself outside of the bounds of external reference.
It is as an absolute music, radically liberated from programmatic concerns, that I want to regard the Ur-poem and the dwelling it builds for human beings. Why? Because the "range of vibration" instituted by the Ur-poem neither expresses nor re-presents anything. In fact, we cannot even regard the Ur-poem as a matter of some "content" at play in the language of the poem, for then that language would be articulating what rst enables its articulation. In other words, the Ursprache provided by the Ur-poem marks the rim of our being, and is thus part and parcel of the condition of the possibility of reference, not itself referential except in a self-gurative fashion. And it is in these terms that absolute music has been thematized. As Hanslick writes:
Music consists of tonal sequences, tonal forms; these have no other content than themselves. They remind us once again of architecture and dancing, which likewise bring us beautiful relationships without content. However each person may evaluate and name the eVect of a piece of music . . . its content is nothing but the audible tonal forms; since music speaks not merely by means of tones, it speaks only tones. 51 And so is the case, I take it, with the Ur-poem and the "range of vibrations" that it "arranges" or einrichtet. About nothing beyond its own coming to be, it does not speak by means of poetic gures, but speaks only poetic gures. As Heidegger writes in the lecture on Andenken: "Die wesentliche Dichtung bezeugt sich zuerst darin, daß ihr Gedichtetes nur im Bereich dieser sich überschwingungden Räume sich hält and aus ihnen spricht," that is: Essential poetry above all bears witness to itself in that what it poetizes only abides and speaks out of the region of those superresonating ranges [which it itself has poetized] (GA 52: 15).
I am trying to develop an analogy between nonreferential tonal ranges and the Ur-poems that key, according to Heidegger, human dwelling. I am doing so given the failure of explanations drawn from Kantian intuitions (Schürmann) and the history of poetics (Warminski) . But it is only an analogy. In the end, the language of the poem will have to prove primary, for otherwise this analogy will usurp the originary place of the Ur-poem. Still, I nd it a helpful analogy for at least two reasons beyond those already given. First, in any piece, the tonal scale is not somehow determining the piece from a mysterious beyond. Instead, it suVuses it. Or we might say that the piece belongs to a tonal abundance such that, at the moment of performance, the piece stands beyond yet remains bound to the scale. This captures, I think, the play of an Ur-poem in human dwelling. It plays over us just as the dichtende Wort over-poetizes the language of the poem. And while we can speak of an Ur-poem as something in itself, a collection of gures, just as we can demarcate tonal scales (e.g., 8-tone and 12-tone scales), at the level of dwelling, the "range of vibration" suVuses our way within the world and upon the earth. A second strength to the analogy is bound to the integral role that silence plays in the deployment of tonal scales. Pieces of music can draw sustenance from the abundance of a tonal scale if and only if they are marked by silence, for tones can resound alongside of one another only when some distance separates their vibrations, only when their vibrations take place in silent spaces. This is crucial, for the Ur-music of the Ur-poem is far from seamless. As we have seen, its ability to call human dwelling to an originary site is predicated upon its ability to expose the silence left in the wake of that monstrous clearing of openness that gathers human beings and Ur-poems alike into the open region of beings. In over-poetizing us as well as the language of the poem, the Ur-poem calls us to the monstrous traces that outline the rim of our being. In other words, poetic dwelling comes into its own in response to an Ur-poem whose absolute music calls us into tonal ranges punctuated by silence.
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